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With regard to the distribution problem that faces 
governments when dividing their limited resources 
between military and economic well-being,1 the liter-
ature has provided two types of explanations: “guns 
versus butter” and “guns yield butter”. To select 
the explanation that is most appropriate, numerous 
empirical comparative studies have been conducted.
Previous research has dealt with the “guns versus 
butter” problem by focusing on whether a govern-
ment’s trade-off between social and national security 
can be identified (Clayton 1976; Russett 1969, 1982; 
Domke et al. 1983; Mintz 1989; Palmer 1990). In 
this line of research, the chief concern is the exis-
tence of the negative impacts of economic growth 
or welfare spending on military expenditures, or 
the negativeimpacts of military spending on the 
economy, which can be determined through regres-
sion analyses. In many works, however, the expected 
negative influences have rarely been reported (Russett 
1982; Domke et al. 1983; Mintz 1989) or have been 
confirmed in only a few studies (Russett 1969; 
Palmer 1990).
With regard to the “guns yield butter” explana-
tion, some researchers have argued that the military 
1 In the literature dealing with the guns-and-butter problem, whereas the perception of what “guns” means is almost uniformly treated as military 
expenditure, no consensus seems to have been reached on the definition of “butter.” Butter is meant, in the theoretical models, to refer to the 
remaining resources to be allocated after the amount for guns has been determined (Powell 1993; Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2000); and in defense 
economics, economic growth itself tends to be equated with butter in order to pursue “the defense-economic growth nexus.” The ideal is to adopt 
the measurement representing the livelihood as a whole, including education, public health, and other measurements of social well-being (e.g. 
Mintz and Huang 1991). Recent research, however, has come to contrast the military sphere with the welfare sphere, since welfare spending is 
thought to occupy the largest amount of government expenditure, and can mostly reflect the government’s orientation toward domestic politics (e.g., 
Whitten and Williams 2011; Hooker and Knetter 2001). Hence, for the purposes of this paper the author simply defines butter as welfare (social 
security).
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mechanisms by which civilians are induced to spend 
money or receive payment for services (e.g., in 
military construction, employment and educational 
costs for military personnel, compensation for the 
economy around bases) may lead to an increase in 
military spending as a whole and that it can also 
cause an economic upturn (Caputo 1975; Mintz and 
Stevenson 1995; Hooker and Knetter 2001; Whitten 
and Williams 2011). Thus, these studies assume 
that military expenditure has a positive impact on 
economic growth; in the political science field in 
particular, the “guns yield butter” mechanism is 
thought to be more plausible than the “guns versus 
butter” (Whitten and Williams 2011).
No consensus has been achieved about the 
validity of these mechanisms, however, because of 
the range of dependent variables (military expen-
diture, social spending, educational spending, 
economic growth), the empirical models’ specifica-
tions (whether to include international variables), 
and the numbers of countries examined (single or 
multiple). However, even if the literature does not 
enable us to determine which mechanism is more 
valid, we can say at least that this unquestioned fact 
exists: every government allocates constrained assets 
into social and national spending (Domke et al. 
1983; Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Key 1940). In this 
regard, despite the fact that the fundamental issue of 
the guns and butter problem is the distribution and 
allocation of limited resources, the aspect of distribu-
tion per se seems to be disregarded.
Based on the theoretical models, distribution itself 
has been focused (Powell 1993). In these models, not 
assuming the temporal priority of decision making 
in regards to either welfare or military spending, it 
is presupposed that a government simultaneously 
decides the allocation of resources. This contempora-
neous decision making infers that a government does 
not a priori which to emphasize: public goods (guns) 
or private goods (butter)2. Although this concept does 
not enable us to postulate that guns could embrace 
some aspect of private goods and vice versa, it does 
capture the fact that government faces a dilemma
as to whether to disburse resources constrained by 
international security and the domestic economy into 
the public and private spheres. And theoretical model 
concentrates on this dilemma directly. If replacing 
the narrowly-focused guns and butter problem into 
the broadly-expanded public and private goods 
dilemma problem, the research design merely reveals 
whether private goods enhance public goods and 
vice versa, and is considered to be insufficient. The 
government relative emphasis on deciding between 
guns or butter at a specific moment in time should 
be directly depicted. Further, factors to mediate this 
dilemma should be sought.
This theoretical perspective evokes the new type 
of setting for empirical models. Concentrating on the 
“versus”-“yields” nexus, empirical models in previous 
research tend to rely on the single equation to iden-
tify a negative or positive relation between guns and 
butter (Huang and Mintz 1992). Although empirical 
studies based on the single equation can clearly iden-
tify the relationship between two elements, it seems 
to have two problems. Firstly, such a scenario might 
elicit the decision that military spending be priori-
tized over welfare spending and that military aspects 
determine welfare. Realistically, a government tries 
to allocate limited resources through a simultaneous 
decision making process: welfare budget decisions 
are not always temporally antecedent to defense 
budget decisions and vice versa. Further, a research 
design that relies on a simple form of dependent 
variable is designed to identify the determinants of 
defense or welfare spending, rather than to identify 
the explanatory factors that govern distribution itself. 
As explained later, if for example public opinion is 
newly added as a key independent variable in the 
single equation, the estimated coefficient of public 
opinion refers only to the effect on welfare or mili-
tary spending, not to government decision making for 
distribution via her dilemma.
Given these points, the research question should 
be, “What are the determinants of the distribution 
problem for governments?” rather than, “Which is 
the best explanation, “guns versus butter” or “guns 
yield butter”? In order to show the attributions of 
distribution politics, in this paper I try to shed light 
on another approach to the guns-and-butter problem 
by identifying the domestic and international deter-
2 Although the military sphere does embody policy areas relating to private goods such as construction of military bases, welfare for military per-
sonnel and pork barrel spending on arms manufacturers. Still, its main aim is to provide defense to a nation and this purpose leads directly to the 
element of public goods. Thus, the author broadly classifies military spending as spending on public goods and welfare spending as spending on 
private goods.
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minants of government resource allocation rather 
than examining whether the “guns versus butter” 
mechanism fits the facts better than the “guns yield 
butter” mechanism does. To this end, two depar-
tures from the previous research are proposed in this 
paper.
The first, regarding the dependent variable, is 
that the ratio between guns and butter (the guns– 
butter ratio, hereinafter referred to as the GB Ratio) 
will be adopted rather than the simple approach used 
in previous research (e.g., military or welfare expen-
diture, economic growth). Thus, to operationalize the 
distribution per se, I will employ the GB Ratio as the 
dependent variable.
The second departure will take voters’ prefer-
ences into account as the independent variable; 
that is, public opinion will be incorporated into the 
empirical model (Eichenberg and Stoll 2003, see also 
Wlezien 1995). Almost all the existing empirical 
studies have focused solely on a government’s (or 
party’s) decision making; however, any govern-
ment’s decision is closely linked to voters’ prefer-
ences, as in the notable theoretical models (Powell 
1993; Garfinkel and Skepardes 2000). In modeling 
the strategic interaction between countries that have 
domestic distribution problems, some theories of 
guns and butter are founded on the utility functions 
of the preferences of the party in power, as well as 
those of the voters. More substantively, the legisla-
tors who form a government cannot neglect their 
constituencies’ preferences. Therefore, my second 
purpose is to identify the effect of public support and 
its contingent effect on a party’s policy position.
In the next section, I will briefly review the two 
branches of literature concerning the “guns versus 
butter” and “guns yield butter” viewpoints and will 
examine the reasons behind the lack of consensus. 
In the third section, as a way of reconciling these 
opposing views, I will explain the importance of 
identifying the determinants of resource allocation 
itself rather than trying to determine whether “guns 
versus butter” or “guns yield butter” provides a better 
fit. I will outline the two modifications on previous 
approaches and will set forth the empirical models 
for this research. Through a reanalysis carried out 
within this new context, the main finding, namely, 
that public support signif icantly contributes to 
parties’ positions, will be presented in the empirical 
section.
the LIterature: trade-off or Guns 
as economIc stImuLI?
We can assume that members of parliament are 
motivated to seek election and that one of the means 
by which they pursue office is the distribution of 
state resources among voters (Cox and McCubbins 
1986). However, given the requirement to maintain a 
certain level of defense capability and the occurrence 
of international armed conflicts, government parties 
also face the distribution problem of allocating some 
proportion of the finite state resources to the security 
sphere. With respect to this distribution phenomenon, 
the academic findings have been controversial.
The earliest empirical studies, which assumed 
a trade-off between guns and butter (the “guns 
versus butter” explanation), attempted to measure 
the negative relationship between military and social 
expenditure (Russett 1969). In these works, two 
types of research design were used, one to explain 
the volatility of military expenditure and the other 
to explain the volatility of welfare expenditure or 
economic growth. These types of empirical models 
served as the foundation for the research that 
followed. For instance, Russett (1969) asserts that, “it 
is quite apparent that defense expenditures have been 
negatively correlated with government spending 
for civilian needs” (423). Palmer (1990) shows, 
however, that the impact of social spending on 
defense spending is negative only when the country 
is classified as “the small allies,” such as Benelux 
and Norway.3 An indirect link is also identified by 
Mintz and Huang (1990): a decrease in military 
spending promotes economic investment and results 
in economic growth.
However, these authors’ findings are thought to 
be anomalous. Other studies come close to seeing 
no trade-off (Benoit 1973; Caputo 1975; Clayton 
1976; Russett 1982; Domke et al. 1983; Eichenberg 
1984; Mintz 1989; Huang and Mintz 1990, 1991). On 
the basis of a comparison of welfare and military 
expenditure in the United States over time, Clayton 
(1976: 377) argues, “World War II did depressc [social 
3 His work also shows right-wing governments as inclined to spend proportionately more on defense than left-wing governments do.
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welfare spending] somewhat, but thereafter there 
simply is no correlation between defense spending 
and public welfare spending.” Later, operationalizing 
education and health spending as the main social 
expenditure, Russett tried to replicate the tradeoff, 
but because the trade-off appears in only one estima-
tion model of the changing rate of health expendi-
ture, he concludes, “I could find no regular pattern 
of trade-offs in the data for the last four decades of 
American history” (Russett 1982: 775). Mintz (1989) 
also reveals that only in the Reagan administration 
can a trade-off be confirmed, and, through refine-
ment of the estimation methodology, Huang and 
Mintz (1990, 1991) conclude that no trade-off exists. 
Not limiting their examination to the U.S. case, 
Domke et al. (1983) analyze models the dependent 
variables of which are both military and welfare 
spending, and confirm no significant negative rela-
tionship other than in the simple linear regressions 
between both military and welfare expenditures.
In defense-related economic studies, the negative 
impact of defense expenditures on economic growth, 
called the defense-growth nexus, has been partially 
confirmed. As Ram (1995: 266) says, “[t]here is 
very little evidence of an overall positive effect of 
defense outlays on growth in a typical case.”4 Mintz 
and Huang (1990, 1991) focus on the indirect effect 
of the depression of military activity on economic 
outcome (Mintz and Huang 1990, 1991). In recent 
studies, dealing with more than 100 developed and 
developing countries, some researchers have empha-
sized that the relationship between defense and 
economic growth is nonlinear. Crespo Cuaresma and 
Reitschuler (2006) reveal, for example, that defense 
expenditure prevents economic growth in smaller 
countries, whereas, in other countries, military 
demand may have positive growth effects. Thus, in 
developing countries, the “guns versus butter” theory 
appears to be validated, but in developed countries, 
the “guns yield butter” concept seems to fit. Thus, 
the authors emphasize that the relationship between 
economic growth and military expenditure results in 
an inverse U-shape.
While economic studies of defense spending do 
partially confirm the negative relationship— that is, 
a trade-off between the military and the economy—
in political science it is generally accepted that such 
a negative relationship cannot be clearly identified 
(Whitten and Williams 2011). Instead, some research 
argues that guns promote the increase of butter 
through personnel employment (Hooker and Knetter 
2001), personnel education (Huang and Mintz 1991), 
defense investment (Brauer and Marlin 1992), and so 
forth.5 The “guns yield butter” explanation has thus 
been much more common in the political science 
field, connecting domestic electoral studies and 
international relations.
In a recent seminal work, Whitten and Williams 
(2011) attempt to demonstrate the validity of “guns 
yield butter”, setting military expenditure as the 
dependent variable and estimating the effects of the 
interaction between the domestic and international 
variables. The “guns yield butter” family of research 
usually sets butter as the regressand, but in these 
authors’ work, the factors for military expenditure 
are explored through a cross-national analysis. 
Whitten and Williams argue that while the determi-
nants of defense spending have long been explored 
in the research, the critical variables inf luencing 
military expenditure—international conflict involve-
ment, parties’ ideological positions (not the simple 
left-right continuum but combinations of Hawk-Dove 
and Austerity-Generous)—have been dismissed.6 
The authors include such domestic and interna-
tional variables (as well as their interaction) into 
their models, revealing that both influence military 
spending. In light of this review, we can classify the 
literature as shown in Table 1.
4 The research evaluating the link between defense expenditure and economic growth is well reviewed in Ram (1995) and Deger and Sen (1995). As 
shown in these reviews, the basis of the theoretical background for the empirical model, which stems from Feder’s (1983) two-sector framework—
“assuming that the economy consists of two distinct sectors, that are labor and capital” (Ram 1995: 259)— is broadly shared.
5 These findings contrast sharply with those of Mintz and Huang (1990, 1991), which argue that a depression of military expenditure leads to eco-
nomic growth and education spending, though the effect is indirect.
6 The authors show how party ideology affects the mechanism by which guns yield butter under the contingency of crisis involvement. Their work 
uses multiple datasets, including the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset for party ideology and the Correlates of War dataset for conflict. This 
paper relies on almost same framework except the setting of dependent variable and incorporating public opinion as a major variable of interest.
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reconsIderInG the Guns–Butter 
ProBLem
The New Explained Component: Guns–Butter 
Ratio
After reviewing the previous research, we can 
conclude that while the “guns yield butter” explana-
tion is thought to be predominated in the political 
science field, the “guns versus butter” is partially 
confirmed in economic studies of defense spending. 
The greatest problem here is, fur ther, that no 
consensus exists on whether the “guns versus butter” 
or “guns yield butter” mechanism is valid (Table 1).
W hat causes the cont roversia l  empi r ica l 
evidence? As demonstrated in Table 1, the dependent 
variables take the various forms of the spending 
itself (military/welfare/educational expenditure) as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or 
of economic growth.7 In order to identify the real 
selection process involved in resource allocation, is 
it appropriate simply to adopt each economic or mili-
tary variable as the regressand? With respect to this 
question, two problems should be considered.
First, models that adopt military expenditure as 
the dependent variable appear to have the ultimate 
aim of identifying the determinants of military 
spending. Inversely, if the regressand is economic 
growth, this model is intended as an economic 
growth model, including military aspects. Hence, 
these types of models cannot directly analyze the 
distribution problem per se, even if welfare spending 
or GDP is emphasized as the key independent vari-
able when assessing the resource allocation problem. 
If based on the setting that gun is a function of butter, 
meaning under the single equation model, effects 
of main independent variables (left-right balance of 
congress and public opinion) and covariates (electoral 
system, international environment, economic condi-
tions) do represent effects only on defense spending, 
not on distribution per se. If the research aim is 
clearly limited to which of “guns versus butter” or 
“guns yield butter” is valid, a single equation model 
can not directly fit to the further research topic as to 
why does the resource allocation between guns and 
butter differ across time and country.
The second problem is one of temporal priority. 
In employing, for instance, a military-dependent 
variable or a welfare-independent variable, one is 
committed to an assumption that decisions regarding 
welfare spending precede those made for military 
expenditure. However, in the case of actual policy 
making, we cannot presuppose that the budget for 
the civilian sector always antedates and determines 
the one for the military sector in every government, 
or vice versa. Furthermore, we can assume that the 
emphasis of each government will vary because 
7 As the notable example, Ram (1995: 267–268) shows that the result changes with different proxies for economic growth.
Table 1: Types of Literature
Types DV Expected Sign Countries Literature
Military (-) Multi s.: Palmer (1990)
n.s.: Mintz and Stevenson (1995)
p.s.:Domke et al. (1983)
Guns vs. Butter Single p.s.:Clayton (1976)
p.s.: Russett (1969)
Welfare (-) Multi Linearity: Benoit (1973)
or Nonlinearity: Crespo Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2006)
E.growth Single Indirect link: Mintz and Huang (1990,1991)
p.s.: Russett (1969)
n.s.:Russett (1982); Mintz (1989); Huang and Mintz
(1990, 1991)
Military (+) Multi s.:Whitten and Williams (2011)
Nonlinearity:Crespo Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2006)
Guns yield Butter Single Caputo (1975)
Welfare or (+) Multi s.: Benoit (1973)
E.growth p.s.:Mintz and Stevenson (1995)
Single p.s.:Hooker and Knetter (2001)
Note: s.:significant; n.s.: not significant; p.s.: partially significant
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of interdepartmental politics, the seriousness of 
domestic and international issues, the political 
composition of the congress/parliament, and so on.
This fact is also reflected in the parties’ utility 
functions of theoretical models (Garf inkel and 
Skaperdas 2000). In conf lict-resolution models, 
the two parties confronting a military crisis face 
domestic constraints from both the voters’ and their 
own preferences for resource allocation. Managing 
these constraints is a key element that shadows the 
negotiating process; parties are supposed to allocate 
resources simultaneously, and the proportion of 
the legislature that belongs to one party or another 
always matters. Hence, the fact that the estimations 
do not necessarily ref lect the actual process may 
contribute to the variation in the empirical results.8
Given these limitations in the previous research, 
how can we introduce an alternative approach for the 
guns–butter distribution problem? In this paper, I 
accomplish this by focusing on distribution per se and 
in order to capture it properly in the study, I adopt 
the ratio (proportion) between welfare and military 
expenditure of each country, the GB Ratio, as the 
dependent variable, instead of using a simpler vari-
able, such as military spending, welfare spending, or 
economic growth. In literature, for example, Eichen-
berg and Stoll’s (2003) study is thought to be the one 
to adopt the ratio of military expenditure to non-
military expenditure instead of simple expenditure. 
However, the authors use the ratio type of dependent 
variable only for the sensitivity analysis and do not 
report the result (406). Further, the ratio itself seems 
not to be adopted directly; rather, the dummy vari-
able representing whether a negative change occurs 
for the public (whether defense spending increases 
relative to public consumption and cash transfers to 
individuals) appears to be estimated9. In this study, 
the main purpose is to consider directly the distribu-
tion itself; I use the GB Ratio per se. And I then try 
to identify the determinants of resource allocation 
through a cross-national analysis.
The New Explanatory Component: Public 
Opinion
Whether the public can understand advanced knowl-
edge on foreign policy issues and thereby have consis-
tent attitudes has long been a controversial topic 
(Aldrich et al. 2006; Baum and Potter 2008). This 
paper does not discuss this topic directly, although 
studies of the American electorate show that “voters 
appear to have held reasonable and coherent attitudes 
about America’s foreign military economic policies” 
(Aldrich et al. 2006: 496).10 Moreover, on the basis 
of the political representation view (Erikson et al. 
2002), it is assumed that political parties care about 
public preferences concerning resource allocation in 
order to achieve better electoral consequences and to 
be responsive to their constituents. Thus, a cyclical 
relationship is supposed to exist: voters pay attention 
to foreign policy during elections, the political parties 
consider such voters’ foreign policy preferences, and 
eventually the right balance (equilibrium) between 
social and national security policy is determined.
How has this relationship between voters and 
political parties (or political elites) been ref lected 
in the previous research? The conf lict-resolution 
models concerning the domestic distribution problem 
incorporate the political parties’ consciousness of the 
median voter’s preferences (Powell 1993; Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas 2000; Ishida 1998). The interaction 
between the voters’ and parties’ goals is what matters 
in these models. This approach reflects the substan-
tive idea that parties cannot set either the military 
budget or the welfare budget without considering 
their domestic audiences’ preferences (Fearon 1997).
Moreover, the impact of public opinion on 
welfare spending and defense spending has been 
confirmed through the literature. As for the welfare 
spending and public opinion, public support is 
revealed to influence on welfare expansion11. Based 
8 The ambiguity of the empirical knowledge generated can hardly be avoided because of the various configurations of the estimation models. Three 
types of explanatory variables are used, the combinations of variables are not uniform in the respective models, and the numbers of countries and 
years included in datasets vary across the studies. It is no surprise that we cannot reach a consensus about whether “guns versus butter” or “guns 
yield butter” is valid.
9 As an independent variable, Carrubba and Singh (2004) and Gifford (2006) employs, notably, the ratio between government expenditure and mili-
tary expenditure. Its main aim, however, seems to compute the proportion, not to directly operationalize welfare component.
10 However, Aldrich et al. (2006: 496) also qualify their argument with the following: “their ability to express those attitudes in their electoral 
choices has depended on attitude accessibility and party platforms—both of which are strongly influenced by elite strategic behavior.”
11 Regarding the research on welfare state and public opinion, two types of research designs are taken: the opinion-policy nexus and the policy-
opinion nexus. Relating to this paper, the opinion-policy nexus should be focused. And the mention is limited to this are of literature.
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on Brooks and Menza (2006), as mass public prefer-
ence allows more income distribution and govern-
ment’s responsibility, the government’s welfare effort 
is predicted to be enhanced. As the varied research 
designs, focusing on the case of United States (Shapiro 
and Young 1989; Wlezien 1995; Erikson et al. 2002), 
comparativists’ approach to an individual country 
such as Canadian case (Soroka and Wlezien 2004), 
and cross-national studies like Brooks and Menza’ 
seminal works (Hicks and Swank 1992; Manza and 
Brooks 2008). Summarizing the above, public pref-
erence moves toward the expansion of welfare i.e. 
moving toward the left-ward, government’s welfare 
efforts is predicted to increase.
In terms of defense spending, a shift towards a 
right-ward tendency in public opinion is also likely 
to inf luence the increase in defense (e.g., Bartels 
1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Eichenberg and 
Stoll 2003). The representative work, Eichenberg 
and Stoll (2003), which uses data from polls admin-
istered in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, and Sweden, attempts to deter-
mine whether public support significantly regulates 
defense expenditure. On the basis of the question, 
“Do you think spending for defense is too much, too 
little, or just about right?” the net public support, or 
“thermostat” (see also Wlezien 1995), is operation-
alized and the effect on spending is analyzed. The 
authors concluded that “[t]he striking feature of the 
analysis is the predominance of the ‘thermostat’. In 
all countries but France, opinion reacts negatively 
and significantly to a change in defense spending” 
(Eichenberg and Stoll 2003: 408).
Taking these theoretical presumptions and the 
empirical knowledge seriously, voter preference 
should be included in any estimation model that 
deals with defense spending as the dependent vari-
able in some form. However, in the empirical litera-
ture of the guns–butter problem, political parties’ 
preferences are very much a focus, but the effect 
of public opinion tends not to be incorporated into 
the empirical models. In order to operationalize 
voter preference, as in this comparative macro-level 
analysis, it seems to be difficult to reflect aggregated 
policy preferences directly, such as policy mood
(Stimson 1999; Kim and Fording 1998; Stevenson 
2001), because of the limitations for comparative use 
of the data from the polls.12 Both the policy mood 
variable and government/presidential/prime ministe-
rial approval data are difficult to collect for all the 
countries observed, so, as an alternative, as a vari-
able representing public opinion in the broader sense, 
a left-right scale computed from the comparative 
social survey must be employed.
Further, to reflect the theoretical model’s setting 
in the empirical model, the most important consider-
ation is the parties’ policy positions as conditioned (or 
confined) by public support and political elite’s pres-
sures. That is, how shifts in public opinion and the 
legislative component affect party policy postures, 
specifically for matters in this analysis. As the afore-
mentioned, public opinion seems to influence both 
welfare and defense spending. Importantly, however, 
public opinion can be reflected to policy outcome, 
the GB ratio, through the conversion at the legisla-
tive process. If the left predominates in congress, 
the expansion of butter relative to guns is likely 
to be realized (e.g., Korpi 1983; Hicks and Swank 
1992; Iversen and Cusack 2000), while if the right 
prevails then vice versa (e.g., Whitten and Williams 
2011; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).13 
Thus, along the lines of the previous research, I will 
test the following hypotheses: (i) when the govern-
ment stresses welfare over defense, in response to 
a leftward move in public opinion and legislative 
balance, the more the proportion of welfare spending 
increases, and (ii) when the government stresses 
defense over welfare, in response to a rightward 
move in public opinion and legislative balance, the 
more the proportion of defense spending increases.
Finally, relating to the electoral aspect, the 
mechanism to connect public preference and legisla-
tive politics. For this purpose, an impact of electoral 
system on the GB ratio should be considered seri-
ously. Under the electoral institution allowing to 
represent broader policy interest , i.e. proportional 
representation (PR) system, legislatures are predicted 
to necessarily concern butter rather than defense. In 
other words, particularistic-targeted private goods 
which can be directly delivered to voters are assumed 
to be favored. Against this, under the small member 
district (SMD) system, each legislator should cover 
12 In Eichenberg and Stoll (2003), the countries included are limited to five, whereas in this research the number of nations expands to seventeen.
13 In regad to defense spending, the result should be more nuanced, as in Whitten and Williams (2011) and Williams and Whitten (2012).
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more of the broader policy spheres, including public 
goods such as national security rather than under the 
PR system (Cox 2008; Cox and McCubbins 2001; 
Cox 1997). Not leads directly to public opinion, as 
the major mediated component from public mass 
to government, this paper will further focus on the 
effect of the electoral institution.
emPIrIcaL anaLysIs
Empirical Strategy: Data, Variable Settings, and 
Estimations
According to the previous theoretical argument, by 
employing the GB Ratio as the dependent variable 
and the domestic and international factors (including 
public opinion) as the independent variables, I 
will conduct an empirical analysis of the country-
year data for the 17 OECD countries14 from 1960 to 
2000.15In the following section, the variables will be 
set.
GB Ratio
The dependent variable, the GB Ratio, is computed 
as the proportions of social security transfers as a 
percentage of GDP and military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP,16 derived from the Comparative 
Welfare States (CWS) dataset (Huber et al. 2004).
GB Ratio =Welfare Expenditureit  (1)Military Expenditureit
According to this equation, when the government 
emphasizes social security (butter) more than 
national security (guns), the value will be larger, and 
when the latter is emphasized, it will be smaller.
The GB Ratio is supposed to contain unit-roots 
with the natural growth of both social and military 
expenditures, as seen in Figure 1. According to a 
Fisher-type unit-root test, GB Ratio significantly 
includes unit-roots in all groups (Inverse normal 
𝑍-value=4.9152, 𝑝-value=1.000). To cope with it, the 
following estimation attempts to determine whether 
co-integration is met, that is, whether the residuals of 
estimations embrace unit-roots will be tested through 
the Fisher-type unit-root test against the residuals 
computed from the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck 
and Katz 1995)17.
As presented in Table 2, the countries with the 
higher values are likely to exhibit a welfarestate 
tendency, such as Austria. Nations with the lower 
values, by contrast, incline to the defense oriented. 
In addition, it seems to be the case that countries 
stressing defense expenditure use a single-member 
district (SMD) electoral system, whereas the welfare-
oriented nations tend to use proportional representa-
tion (PR). The relationship between GB Ratio and 
electoral systems is thus flagged for further examina-
tion.
The key independent var iables regarding 
domestic politics are as follows: public support for 
the government parties, the left-right composition 
of each parliament, parties’/governments’ policy 
positions on welfare and the military, the number of 
coalition parties, election year, and electoral system.
Public opinion
As mentioned before, the data on public aggregated 
policy preferences available for comparative anal-
ysis are not abundant. The ideal variable would be 
something like policy mood or level of government 
approval in the OECD countries, but it is difficult to 
unify the sets of approval data in the main dataset 
because of each poll’s uniqueness. As an alterna-
tive, to capture the electorate’s aggregated policy 
14 Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Netherland, France, Italy, German, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are examined. Some studies, especially economic studies of defense spending, include more 
than 100 countries; the use of CMP data for OECD nations restricts the applicability of the observations.
15 The period under examination is determined by the availability of CMP data, one of the main datasets.
16 The social welfare variable is “SSTRAN,” and the military variable is “MIL” in the codebook. Based on guns and butter theory directly, we must 
rely on gunsbutter index, not 
butter
guns  index. However, the direct GB ratio (
guns
butter) cannot avoid to be so small, ranging from 0.0426 to the max value of 1.78, 
and causes the fragile estimation results, even after logarithmizing index. Thus, as the alternative without losing substantive understanding of re-
source distribution, the BG-ratio is used as the GB ratio in this research.
17 As an alternative, Feasible Ordinary Least Square (FGLS) and OLS with the fixed effect model can be applied for this analysis. In this research, 
however, the main concern is to expose the overall estimators, not just the within estimators. Thus, a PCSE model is employed here. Further, in 
order to correct the first order condition of Autoregression (AR(1)), the restriction that AR(1) of the error term is equal within all countries is im-
posed, as Beck and Katz (1995) suggest.
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Figure 1: Transitions and Unit-roots of GB Ratio in All Panels
Table 2: The GB Ratio of Each Country
Tendency Country Mean Min Max Std.Div.
USA 1.708 .562 3.832 .885
Australia 2.659 1.063 5.345 1.008
UK 2.738 1.046 5.338 1.352
↑ France 4.345 2.109 6.922 1.189
Defense oriented Norway 4.361 2.212 7.695 1.491
Canada 4.789 1.581 10.33 2.342
Switzerland 5.733 2.229 10.829 2.399
Germany 5.808 2.308 12.63 3.050
Sweden 5.826 2 13.540 2.878
Italy 6.010 2.932 9.286 1.914
Belgium 6.148 3.139 11.202 2.494
NZ 6.370 4.624 9.906 1.423
Denmark 6.737 2.567 12.152 2.971
Welfare-oriented Netherland 6.874 1.756 12.670 2.809
↓ Finland 7.614 2.708 15.019 3.5090
Japan 8.229 3.455 12.184 2.672
Ireland 8.274 3.857 14.210 2.976
Austria 15.197 7.487 23.490 4.332
total 6.094 .562 23.490 3.808
Note: The value for Germany until 1990 is that of West Germany.
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preferences, the left-right scale computed by Kim 
and Fording (1998) will be adopted. Since Kim and 
Fording’s measurement is founded on the median 
voter’s preferences, a voter ideology index clearly fits 
the past theoretical models’ implications18. Kim and 
Fording’s voter ideology index is calculated on the 
basis of parties’ share of the vote, which corresponds 
to the voters’ policy preferences as reflected in their 
selection of the nearest party located on the left- right 
scale. The authors “conceive of elections as large-
scale opinion polls (8),” and compute the voter’s 
ideological position from each party’s ideological 
posture19. The median voter is taken to be located 
between those parties immediately to the right and 
the left of the most supported party. According to the 
defined intervals between left and right parties, the 
median voter’s ideological position is computed as 
below (Kim and Fording 1998: 81):
𝑀 = 𝐿 + [(50 − 𝐶)/𝐹)] × 𝑊, (3)
where 𝑀  denotes median voter position (ideological 
score), 𝐿  denotes the lower end (ideological score) 
of the interval containing the median, 𝐶 denotes 
the cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not 
including the interval containing the median, 𝐹 
denotes the frequency (vote share) in the interval 
containing the median, and 𝑊 denotes the width of 
the interval containing the median.
Left-right composition
Partisan politics is one of the critical motivations 
of government behavior. Partisan theory assumes 
that parties of the left are more willing to disburse 
welfare expenditure than are parties of the right 
(Hibbs 1977). Thus, the larger the proportion of left 
representatives in parliament, the more the GB Ratio 
is likely to be enhanced. Inversely, when the right 
comprises the majority in parliament, the more the 
GB Ration is likely to decrease, because the right 
is assumed to be pro-military. In addition, fluctua-
tions in the strength of left and right should make 
it possible to predict the GB Ratio’s up-and-down 
movements, in line with the left-right composition of 
parliament.20
Further, as stated above, the interaction between 
the left-right composition and public opinion will be 
also estimated.
The parties’ policy posture
I will employ two types of variables on policy posi-
tion, with one focusing on the government parties’ 
posture and the other referring to the sort of policy 
mood that is shared by all the parties in a particular 
nation.21
First, since they directly affect the outcome of 
the distribution, the political parties’ positions need 
to be analyzed as the key independent variables. In 
Whitten and Williams (2011), the parties’ ideological 
positions are set as one of the main regressors. 
Whitten and Williams argue for combining the hawk-
dove scale for defense ideology and the small-big-
government scale for welfare ideology, rather than 
assuming a single left-right scale. To operationalize 
18 Kim and Fording’s measurement is based on three assumptions:(1) the left-right ideology dimension can be adopted everywhere in industrial 
democracies, (2) the left-right ideology determines voters’ choices, and (3) this dimension is comparable across countries (Kim and Fording 1998: 
75–80).




ΣProLeft statement − ΣProRight statement
. (2)ΣProLeft statement + ΣProRight statement  
The above value has a range of -1 to 1. The greater the value is, the further left the political view.
20 The left-right composition is calculated as follows.  
 
 
Left Right Ratio =
Left Seat Percentageit  (4)Right Seat Percentageit  
Data comes from CWS. The variables are labeled “LEFTSEAT” and “RTSEAT” to indicate left seat percentage and right seat percentage, respec-
tively. In calculations for the United Kingdom, however, the left party’s posture is not classified as “LEFTSEAT”; instead, the ratio between “RT-
SEAT” and “CNSEAT,” which is a percentage of total seats in parliament for center secular parties, is employed to impute the missing party. In 
Germany, too, the right-wing party’s value does not exist, so the ratio used is between “LEFTSEAT” and “CNSEAT”.
21 In Whitten and Williams (2011), government ideology is further detailed by using the same data here, CMP. Their method is to classify the parties 
into four dimensions, combining the parties’ welfare (austere and generous) and defense (hawk and dove) positions. In addition, the conflict in-
volvement effect conditioned by these positions is investigated. Whereas their approach ultimately attempts to clarify the determinants of defense 
spending and the contingent effects of international factors, in this study the main focus is on distribution per se so that domestic factors receive 
greater attention (the combination of two policy dimensions are downplayed), and the conditioning variables are different (public opinion rather 
than international factors).
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the government parties’ ideologies specifically, they 
use the CMP data. In this paper, I adopt the same 
operationalization of Whitten and Williams (2011) 
for the government parties’ policy posture to begin 
with,22 but go a step further in attempting to find 
out its marginal effect when conditioned by public 
support.
Second, to consider the direct link between 
the governing party’s ideology and policy output, 
Whitten and Williams’s approach is necessary, but 
is a concern solely with the ruling party’s ideology 
sufficient to capture the aggregated preferences of 
the political elites? At the least, the opposing parties’ 
positions affect the ruling parties’ positions during 
and after elections. It would seem that the parties’ 
macro-policy trends, including those of the ruling 
and opposition parties23 should be specified. To do so, 
the computation of the policy mood by Stimson (1999), 
which introduces the common movement underlying 
the multivariable-time-series, will be applied. By 
imputing the missing values for a non-election period 
through Stimson’s algorithm, the time-series variable 
for each party’s position is established and the factor 
score is computed. This score represents the common 
movement of all parties’ policy positions; we can 
refer to it as the party policy mood. In this paper, I 
will set the party welfare policy mood and the party 
military policy mood as variables. Thus, the two 
models, “the Government Party Policy model” and “the 
All Parties’ Policy Mood model,” will be estimated 
separately.
With respect to the two types of party position 
variables, we can predict the following: When the 
government parties claim more spending for welfare 
or the party welfare policy mood is enhanced, then 
the GB Ratio will increase, and when the govern-
ment parties argue for more military expenditure and 
the party military policy mood rises, the GB Ratio 
will decrease.
Interactions among major domestic variables
As the most important, the above-raised four vari-
ables (left-right tendency in public opinion, left-right 
composition in congress, government welfare policy, 
and government defense policy) of interests are 
assumed to be interacted. What we mostly want to 
know is the marginal effect of the ruling party/-ies’ 
policy positions on GB ratio, moving the left-right 
tendency of public preference. The party policy’s 
marginal effect is, however, not merely conditioned 
with public policy preference, but also differed along 
the left-right composition in congress. Under the 
situation in which the median policy preference is 
located on the left-side and the leftist is preceded in 
the congress, government is expected to emphasize 
butter, social welfare than guns, defense. Against 
this, when the median voter is allocated around the 
right ward and the rightist prevails in congress, the 
government is predicted to shift her focus on defense. 
To completely assess the interactions among public 
opinion, party posture and left-right composition 
in congress, interaction terms among them should 
be fully specified in one estimation model. Accu-
rately, the interaction terms should be composed of 
following four variables: the median voter’s left-right 
position, party’s welfare and defense policy posi-
tions, and left-right proportion in legislature. Inter-
action terms among four variables yield 6 patterns 
of two-way, 4 three-way and 1 four-way, in total 11 
patterns of interaction terms.
With these interactions, the coming estimations 
will try to figure out the marginal effects of welfare 
and defense policy at two different transitions of the 
left-right scales of political mass and elite, i.e. public 
opinion and legislatures. Two types of figures will 
be represented, which is firstly about the welfare 
policy’s marginal effect and secondly the defense 
policy’s marginal effect.
Other variables for domestic politics
Composition of the government is expected to have 
varying effects on the GB Ratio. The more parties 
there are in a government, the more the number of 
veto points increases and the higher the probability 
of a policy split becomes. Resource allocation may 
be affected by whether parties that have extreme 
preferences for military or for welfare issues take 
part in the government. The numbers of parties in a 
government are included in the model, and the sign 
is expected to be positive; that is, when the coalition 
22 When a coalition government is in power, the average value among parties is used.
23 In the phase of the parties’ policy-making process (especially the manifesto-making process before election), it is unclear whether the policy posi-
tions of the parties are reflected in one another’s positions. Thus,it makes sense to examine the shared movement among all the parties, rather than 
that of the party that subsequently forms the government.
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expands, the GB Ratio increases (i.e., the proportion 
of welfare spending rises).
As described in the literature on the political 
business cycle, the government party tries to increase 
social expenditure in an election year to appeal to the 
electorate. If this is the case, the GB Ratio will likely 
increase before an election (Mintz 1988). Thus, the 
dummy variable for the pre-election year is estimated 
as the control, and a positive sign is predicted for it.
In addition, the PR system is assumed to promote 
more welfare spending, and the SMD inversely, to 
promote military spending. Thus, the electoral insti-
tution dummy, in which 1 represents the PR system 
and 0 represents other systems, is expected to show a 
positive sign.
Other variables for international politics
For the key variables of international relations, I will 
adopt the four that arise in the works of Eichenberg 
and Stoll (2003) and Whitten and Williams (2011). 
With regard to the importance of the international 
environment, Eichenberg and Stoll argue that, “[t]he 
external conflict and alliance dynamic variables are 
the same as those specified in the analysis of change 
in public support.” These include the variables of 
“war involvements, MIDs [the Militarized Interstate 
Disputes], and the gap in defense spending change 
between the United States and each state” (2003: 
413). On the basis that, “[t]his literature has largely 
overlooked the possibility of interactive relation-
ships between domestic and international factors in 
shaping military spending” (Whitten and Williams 
2011: 119), Whitten and Williams include nations’ 
capabilities, an alliance with the U.S. dummy, and 
conflict involvement (the sum of hostility score). In 
this study, drawing on both works, I will use national 
capability, alliance with the United States, a Cold 
War dummy, risk attitude, and conflict involvement.
National capability is defined as, “an index of 
a state’s proportion of total system capabilities in 
6 areas” (Bennett and Stam 2000: 15). To control 
for a nation’s international positions, the effect of 
national capability will be added; its sign is expected 
to be negative, which means that the major countries 
are apt to spend more on defense.24 In dealing with 
an alliance with the United States, the two studies’ 
approaches differ: Eichenberg and Stoll (2003) use 
the gap in defense spending between the United 
States and other members of the alliance, whereas 
Whitten and Williams (2011) adopt a dummy repre-
senting the U.S. alliance. This study concerns itself 
with how U.S. military assumptions work for the 
reduction of military expenditure and ultimately 
affect the GB Ratio. Thus, following Whitten and 
Williams (2011), a U.S. alliance dummy will be 
included. In addition, the Cold War dummy25 is 
introduced to deal with its critical effect on military 
expenditure.
To control for a nation’s conflict involvement, I 
employ the MIDs used in both studies. According 
to the empirical model shown above, the degree to 
which the effect of conflict involvements is included. 
For this purpose, numbers of military conflicts facing 
a country increases is predicted to enhance the 
portion of guns. Descriptive statistics of all variables 
are in the Table 3.
Empirical Results
The estimation results are reported in Table 4, which 
shows (i) the Government Party Policy model and (ii) 
the All Parties Policy Mood model, without interac-
tion with public opinion in order to gauge the main 
variables’ effects in a straightforward manner. An 
initial look at Table 4 suggests that the significance 
of lagged dependent variables implies the existence 
of unit-roots in all models. Most significant, however, 
is the finding that co-integration is met in all models 
when the results of Fisher-type unit-root tests for 
residuals are taken into consideration.26 Thus, the 
possibility of a spurious causality from the non-
stationary is likely to be rejected.
It is clear that the proportion of butter increases 
when the ratio of seats obtained by the left rises in 
parliament and, inversely, that the proportion of 
24 “CINC” is the name of the variable in the Correlates of War (COW). National capability has already embraced the component of military expen-
diture. It may cause partially endogeneous relationships between the independent and dependent variable. As an alternative, GDP per capita can 
be adopted to represent national capability. But, its measurement also causes the strong correlation between the left-hand side variables: GDP per 
capita and GDP growth rate. Taking either operationalization, a certain level of correlation or an endogeneous problem should occur. To this end, 
in order to make the result compatible with previous research, the author employs “CINC”.
25 The dummy receives a score of 1 for the Cold War period and 0 for after the Cold War.
26 The null hypothesis is that all panels contain unit-roots. Although unit-root tests for TSCS data vary, the TSCS data are imbalanced, so a test 
based on unit-roots in each panel is employed.
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guns increases with an increase in the ratio of seats 
obtained by the right. This outcome accords with 
expectations and holds significant for all remaining 
specifications. With respect to policy positions, a 
government’s welfare position significantly deter-
mines the increase of butter relative to defense. It 
also appears, though it is not significant in the full 
model, that the effect of the government’s defense 
position allows the GB Ratio to decrease. According 
to these results, partisan politics seem to determine 
resource allocation strongly.
With regard to the effect of public opinion, we 
can infer that butter is increasingly emphasized as 
the public mood moves toward the left, especially 
as indicated in Model 4. Interestingly, Model 4 
comprises international factors without the party’s 
policy position. If we eliminate the effect of the 
government party’s policy posture, the effect of 
public opinion looks like the other domestic effect. 
The median voter’s location seems to promote butter 
to some extent, and in the next analysis, we need to 
specify further the detailed transition in the marginal 
effects of government policy preconditioned by 
public opinion.
For the political control variables, in the PR 
system, butter is likely to be emphasized through 
all models. This institutional finding has not been 
confirmed by the guns-and-butter study. The back-
ground to this finding is supposed to be that in the 
countries adopting the PR system, such as North 
Europe and the Benelux countries, redistribution 
rather than expansion of the armed forces forms 
the basis of the domestic welfare issue. By contrast, 
election year and number of coalition parties are 
not statistically significant, although their effects do 
show a tendency to enhance the welfare proportion. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the effect of 
public opinion alone cannot be significantly verified. 
It can at least be safely asserted that public support 
may not influence the enhancement of both military 
and welfare simultaneously.
Next, in terms of international factors, a nation’s 
position and its alliance with the United States signif-
icantly promotes guns, though risk attitudes and 
conflict involvement do not show the sign and statis-
tical significance predicted. We can say, at least, that 
the major power countries are required to enhance 
their armies and that the U.S. alliance compels part-
ners to share the burden (e.g., military construction, 
sympathetic budget allocation) to some extent.27 
Finally, the Cold War dummy clearly shows a signifi-
cant negative effect on the GB Ratio. During the Cold 
War, every developing country tended to increase 
guns rather than butter, which can be understood 
in line with the influence of the major power. In the 
last model, focusing solely on international factors, 
though the risk finding is against expectations, the 
alliance with the U.S. is shown to promote guns.
27 This finding does not agree with that presented by Whitten and Williams (2011).
Table 3: Summary Statistics for All Samples
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
GB-Ratio 6.095 3.81 0.562 23.49 713
Left-Right Proportion 2.003 2.215 0 15.613 737
Median Voter’s LR Prop. 56.005 12.1 19.414 90.944 737
Gov.Welfare Policy 5.398 3.433 0 23.1 709
Gov.Defense Policy 1.847 2.21 0 13.7 709
All Party Wel. Pol. 12.61 7.039 0.054 45.122 675
All Party Def. Pol. 2.386 1.924 -1.424 13.011 671
Coalition Parties 1.777 1.198 0 5 701
Proportional Representation — — 0 1 737
Election Year — — 0 1 736
National Capability 0.02 0.037 0 0.215 737
Alliance with US 0.278 0.448 0 1 737
External Conflicts 2.326 4.569 0 36 737
Cold War — — 0 1 737
CPI 55.74 33.809 5.75 114.2 737
GDP growth 3.068 2.961 -7.100 37.6 525
Population over 65 0.125 0.026 0.057 0.181 737
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Table 4: The Determinants of The GB-Ratio (without interaction terms)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government Policy Model All Party Model Int’l Var’s Model
GB ratio(t-1) 0.967*** 0.969*** 0.979*** 0.976*** 0.983***
(0.00949) (0.00896) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.00944)
[Political Variables]
left–right balance (in congress) 0.0330*** 0.0281*** 0.0416*** 0.0368***
(0.00955) (0.00980) (0.0111) (0.0116)
left–right (median voter) 0.000961 -0.000246 0.00295* 0.00180
(0.00140) (0.00144) (0.00158) (0.00172)
Gov. welfare policy 0.0119** 0.0136***
(0.00484) (0.00438)
Gov. defense policy 0.00337 -0.0146***
(0.00626) (0.00485)
all party wel. policy 0.00184 0.00256
(0.00146) (0.00160)
all party def. policy 0.0533*** 0.0388***
(0.0103) (0.0103)
Gov. coalition -0.00280 -0.00756 0.0261* 0.0182
(0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0139) (0.0149)
electoral system (PR=1) 0.149** 0.172*** 0.141** 0.155**
(0.0656) (0.0634) (0.0668) (0.0754)
election year -0.00577 -0.00990 -0.0121 -0.0201
(0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0342) (0.0330)
[International Variables]
national capability (t-1) -0.377 -0.326
(0.478) (0.420)
US alliance (t-1) -0.0264 0.0321 -0.144***
(0.0473) (0.0454) (0.0529)
external conflicts (t-1) -0.00649 -0.00611 -0.00828**
(0.00404) (0.00458) (0.00413)
Cold War -0.329*** -0.432*** -0.439***
(0.0607) (0.0652) (0.0828)
[Other Social and Economic Variables]
CPI (t-1) 0.000985 0.00431*** -0.000471 0.00403*** 0.0000488
(0.000996) (0.000799) (0.00112) (0.000983) (0.000965)
GDP growth(t-1) -0.0197*** -0.0204*** -0.0145*** -0.0149*** -0.0183***
(0.00517) (0.00517) (0.00543) (0.00553) (0.00535)
elderly population -3.863*** -3.406*** -2.429** -2.160* -2.357***
(0.892) (0.806) (1.128) (1.105) (0.855)
Observations 502 502 464 464 506
Numbers of Countries 18 18 18 18 18
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.9603 0.9586 0.9582 0.9507 0.9629
Wald 𝑥2 132135.26 84657.16 78866.09 45355.80 123029.08
Fisher-Type Unit-root Test for Residuals
Inversed Normal 𝑍-value -18.6310 -17.9627 -18.1265 -16.6328 -20.0240
(𝑝-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Inverse Logit 𝑡(89) 𝐿 * -30.5941 -28.8727 -28.8314 -26.3448 -33.7880
(𝑝-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: In the section of variables, standard errors in parentheses. For the Fisher-type test, 𝑝-values in parentheses.
* (𝑝 <0.10), ** (𝑝 <0.05), *** (𝑝 <0.01)
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As a complementary analysis to check for robust-
ness, let us show the results of the parties’ policy 
moods. It can be confirmed that the left-right propor-
tion determines the distribution as predicted. While 
party defense mood is statistically significant against 
the prediction, party welfare mood still yields the 
significant predicted result in both models including 
the welfare policy mood. In this model, we can 
confirm that guns expand when the government 
believes there is a greater risk of involvement in 
international conflict.
In light of the above models, we can brief ly 
conclude that (i) a parliament’s left-right composi-
tion strongly influences distribution along the line of 
conventional knowledge; (ii) the major powers tend 
to enlarge their military forces; (iii) the PR system 
is likely to promote redistribution relative to milita-
rization; and (iv) only the effect of public opinion on 
resource allocation cannot be well confirmed.
As for the models that investigate the marginal 
effect with the changing conditions of left-right 
balance in legislature and public opinion, as the 
second analysis, the substantive interpretation will 
be guided by Braumoeller (2004) and Bramber et al. 
(2004), as presented in Figures 2–3.
Figure 2 represents the marginal effects of 
government welfare policy modified with left-right 
composition in congress. The upper line represents 
the case in which a median voter locates on left-
ward and the lower line indicates the case in which 
a median voter locates right-ward. In Figure 2, 
as the proportion of leftist increases in congress, 
the government welfare position is more likely to 
enhance the proportion of butter relative to guns. 
And, as the upper line implies, when the median 
voter is located towards the left (one standard devia-
tion higher than the mean of public opinion variable), 
Table 5: The Determinants of The GB-
Ratio (with interaction terms)
(1)
Lagged GB ratio 0.969***
(0.00858)
[Political Variables]
left-right balance in congress -0.323
(LRC) (0.210)
left-right of median voter -0.0122*
(PubOp) (0.00677)
Gov. welfare policy 0.0416
(Wel) (0.0524)














































Numbers of Countries 18
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.9644
Wald 𝑥2 623169.88
Fisher-Type Unit-root Test for Residuals
Inversed Normal 𝑍-value -17.4872
(𝑝-value) 0.000
Inverse Logit 𝑡(89) 𝐿 * -27.7101
(𝑝-value) 0.000
Note: In the section of variables, standard errors in parentheses. For 
the Fisher-type test, 𝑝-values in parentheses.
* (𝑝 <0.10), ** (𝑝 <0.05), *** (𝑝 <0.01)
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the ruling parties’ welfare policy tends to more influ-
ence the rise in butter. When, for example, the leftist 
in congress is 2.2 times as much as the rightist and 
public leans toward left-direction, the GB ratio rises 
by 0.216 percent as a ruling party/parties provokes 
welfare policy in manifesto by 1 percent.
The lower line, however, indicates the marginal 
effect of welfare policy shows a negative sign. Thus, 
when the median preference is on towards the right (one 
standard deviation lower the mean), even if the left-
ists are about 1.75 times as prominent as rightists (with 
95 percent confident intervals) in congress, the GB 
ratio still skews to guns. Contrasted with the above 
example, when the leftists in congress are 2.2 times 
more than the rightist, but the public orients to the 
right, the GB ratio decreases by -0.074 percent, as a 
ruling party/parties emphasize welfare policy by 1 
percent. In any case, Figure 2 clearly shows govern-
ment welfare policy reflects the emphasis of butter 
relative to guns, when the left wing prevails both in 
the political mass and elite.
Secondly, as seen in Figure 3, the marginal 
effects of defense policy are modified with the left- 
right composition in congress, and the upper and 
lower lines refer to the same as Figure 2. Clearly, 
when the left-wing prevails in the legislature and the 
median voter is located towards the left, even though 
government stresses defense policy, the GB ratio 
skews to the left. Against this intuitive result, the 
case in which the public leans to the right is difficult 
to interpret. At least, it can be read out that even the 
left prevails in the legislature, guns are emphasized 
as long as the median voter orients to the right.
However, the result is a bit counterintuitive, as 
the proportion of the left increases in the legisla-
ture, a proportion of guns increase relative to butter. 
Superficially thinking, when the proportion of the 
left increases in the legislature, the defense policy 
is not necessarily predicted to enhance the propor-
tion of defense spending. It suggests, in Figure 3, the 
lower line should be located in the area of negative 
sign, and depict the downward trend to the left (pres-
ently downward trend to the right).
This counterintuitive result, however, critically 
fits to the knowledge in previous research: the dovish 
government generously expanding its fiscal expen-
diture is apt to expense more for military spending 
rather than the hawkish government austerely 
retrenching finance, to reduce military spending 
(Williams and Whitten 2012). The right-prevailed 
Figure 2: The Interaction between the Welfare Policy Position and Public Opinion
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legislature tries to recuse the unregulated military 
spending in the light of fiscal discipline.28 This mech-
anism is thought to influence the relative emphasis 
on defense spending when compared to the-right-
skewed-legislature whose foundational roots are in 
the right-ward oriented voters.
Finally, with regard to economic controls, the 
result of the CPI is fragile in Models 3 and 5 in 
Table 4, in both gun and butter directions. It can be 
said a rise of prices is likely to stimulate butter, as 
in Models 2 and 4, which are significant. By way of 
contrast, economic growth seems to enhance defense 
spending.
As for an increase in the elderly population, 
contrary to the prediction, it suggests, significantly, 
an increase in guns, not butter. For this results, the 
author did the sensitivity check in “Supplementary 
Materials” to confirm the multicollinearity and its 
inf luence on the substantial interpretation among 
public opinion, balance in legislature and govern-
ment policy. Values of variance inf lation factors 
(VIFs) indicates the existence of multicollinearity 
in the model with interaction terms in Table 5 (not 
in the one without interaction terms in Table 4). 
Thus in the supplementary analysis, the author tries 
to figure out whether inserting and removing the 
suspected variables, i.e. CPI and elderly population, 
changes the marginal effects of government welfare/
defense policy modified with public opinion and 
left-right proportion in congress. The results imply 
no substantial change of interpretations regarding 
marginal effects both with and without CPI and 
elderly population. In the line of Brambor et al. (2006), 
Braumoeller (2004) and Allison (1977), all effects of 
major variables and constitutive terms among them 
should be emphasized, sacrificing a brittle result with 
multicollinearity.
Concluding Remarks
There are three principal findings of this research 
into the attributions of distribution politics. First, 
parliamentary partisanship strongly affects resource 
28 If this rationale might be applicable to welfare spending, the marginal effect on GB ratio should not be so much downward trend, since welfare 
spending is not so much constrained by the fiscal discipline. It can be said that in this situation, even in the case of generous doves with the major-
ity of the left, the government defense policy does not heavily impact on guns’ enhancement relative to butter. Relating to this point, why gener-
ous leftists prefer the enhancement of guns should be a future research concern.
Figure 3: The Interaction between Defense Policy Position and Public Opinion
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allocation (when the left constitutes the majority, the 
proportion of butter increases, and when right consti-
tutes the majority, the proportion of guns increases). 
Second, the public left-right scale modifies the effect 
of parties’ policy positions on distribution in the 
cases of both welfare and defense positions: when the 
median voter is located to the left and the left-wing 
prevails in congress, the government’s welfare policy 
naturally contributes to a shift toward butter, and 
when the median voter is located to the right and the 
leftist predominates in congress, the government’s 
defense policy contributes to a shift toward guns. 
Regarding this result, however, conclusion should be 
withheld in terms of the counterintuitive result: while 
a generous dovish government who is founded on 
the left-oriented voters prefers guns, a strict hawkish 
government who seeks the tight fiscal discipline tries 
to apply its austerity to the defense sphere. Third, 
the electoral system influences distribution: in a PR 
system, butter tends to be stressed. Finally especially 
in the model limited to international factors, national 
capability, Cold War, and external conflicts are found 
to contribute to an increase in guns, intuitively.
These f indings can be obtained by adopting 
the GB Ratio as the dependent variable and by 
employing the public left-right scale as a conditioned 
variable, perspectives that have generally been 
dismissed in the literature.
What implications can be drawn from the above 
evidence? At the least, we can infer that mainly 
domestic and partially internal conditions determine 
government decision making regarding defense vs. 
welfare output. In addition, both party elites and the 
general public have a certain level of influence on 
distribution politics, although the extent of this influ-
ence is limited, as the results show: public opinion 
can restrict the effects of a government’s policy state-
ment (i.e., manifesto), but its direct impact cannot be 
identified. All that can be said is that, through some 
route, public opinion affects the government’s distri-
bution politics by restricting its available policy posi-
tions.
Furthermore, we can conclude that domestic 
politics influence distribution far more than do inter-
national concerns. Even if international factors show 
a partially direct effect, any effect on the GB Ratio is 
limited, except for the effect of the Cold War.
In order to improve this paper’s approach, some 
modifications should be made. For the contingency of 
public support, it was not possible to capture various 
aspects of public support, such as “macropartisanship” 
(MacKuen et al. 1989) and “policy mood” (Stimson 
1999). At the very least, the left-right tendency, 
which is included under public opinion here, requires 
assessment in any future analysis, so that its effects 
on policy outcome, including its contingency effect, 
can be computed.
Although some external (environmental) factors, 
such as international conf lict involvement, have 
been taken into consideration, other crucial attribu-
tions affect resource allocation politics significantly. 
Natural disasters are the most striking of these 
factors at present. The probability of crisis caused 
by natural calamities seems to be more frequent 
and serious for developed countries, as the case of 
the recent Japan earthquake shows. In such cases, 
the distribution for guns and butter is thought to 
be strongly influenced by military mobilization for 
disaster relief and by social spending for reconstruc-
tion. Thus, a future analysis of the impact of natural 
disasters on resource allocation may be indispens-
able.
Furthermore, even for studies of just one nation, 
we could use another approach for the analysis of 
the complicated endogenous relationships among 
public opinion, party policies, external events, and 
final policy outcomes. This kind of work requires an 
advanced statistical method such as “modeling the 
macro polity,” as advocated by Brandt and Freeman 
(2009). If we can successfully capture the cyclical 
relationship among these political variables, it might 
also speak to issues of political representation (e.g., 
Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson et al. 2002), from voters’ 
preferences to government parties’ accountability 
and responsiveness to them (Manin et al. 1999). To 
complete this work, an advanced method, such as 
Bayesian statistical inference and the application of 
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, 
should be considered. Analyses of greater detail and 
depth might be expected from such approaches.
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